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BLD-180 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-2684
___________
IN RE:  MARK SNYDER, Debtor
MARK SNYDER,
Appellant
v.
EDWARD J. QUINLAN; BRANDON R. BLAKE;
RJB PROPERTIES GROUP, INC.; RICHARD J. BANDEL;
ARBORS MANAGEMENT, INC.; PAPERNICK & GHEFSKY, P.C.;
ROBERT L. MURPHY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(W.D. Pa. Civil No. 07-cv-01281)
District Judge:  Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 14, 2009
Before:  McKEE, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed:  June 23, 2009)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
2Mark Snyder, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania affirming a United States Bankruptcy
Court order granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss an adversary proceeding, and denying
Snyder’s motion to reconsider an order denying his request to remand the adversary
proceeding to state court.  We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.
Snyder and his siblings became indebted to Appellee Edward Quinlan pursuant to
the terms of two notes, which were secured by mortgages on motel properties owned by
Snyder and members of his family.  In addition, Snyder managed and was the sole
member of Allegheny Remodeling, LLC, which became indebted to Appellee Richard
Bandel.  This obligation was secured with a mortgage on an apartment property.
In 2003, Snyder, his siblings, and Allegheny Remodeling defaulted on the
mortgages, and foreclosure proceedings were initiated in state court on the motel and
apartment properties.  Default judgments were entered in favor of Quinlan and Bandel in
the foreclosure proceedings.  Shortly before the default judgments were entered, however,
Snyder and his family members began to file bankruptcy petitions.  The Bankruptcy Court
granted in rem relief from the automatic stay in two of the Snyder family members’
bankruptcy cases in order to allow Quinlan and Bandel to complete the foreclosure
proceedings.  The apartment property was sold in 2004 via Sheriff’s sale to Bandel, who
assigned his bid to RJB Properties Group, Inc.  The motel properties were sold via
Sheriff’s sale to Edward and Rose Quinlan in January 2005.
Brandon Blake was apparently mistakenly listed as the grantee on the deed for the1
apartment property due to a clerical error.  Blake was later dismissed as a party.
Allegheny Remodeling was dismissed as a party for failure to obtain counsel. 2
Snyder also named additional defendants in his amended complaint who were dismissed
because Snyder did not have the permission of the court to add new parties to his action.
3
In October 2005, Snyder and Allegheny Remodeling filed a complaint in
Pennsylvania state court against Quinlan, RJB Properties, and Brandon Blake seeking
quiet title to the apartment and motel properties, cancellation of the mortgages and
Sheriff’s deeds, and monetary damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, fraud,
conversion, and replevin.  Quinlan, Blake, and RJB Properties moved to reopen Snyder’s
bankruptcy case, which had been dismissed, and filed a notice of removal of the state
court action with the Bankruptcy Court.   The Bankruptcy Court vacated its dismissal of1
Snyder’s bankruptcy case, and created an adversary proceeding for the removed state
court action.  The Bankruptcy Court also granted Snyder’s motion to amend his
complaint.
In May 2006, Snyder filed an amended complaint asserting claims for accounting,
replevin, conversion, and violations of the Landlord Tenant Act with respect to the taking
of his personal property at the apartment property, where he had resided.   At a June 2,2
2006, hearing in Bankruptcy Court, Snyder conceded that he owned certain tools and
building materials in the apartment property, but stated that his mother, who was not a
party to the action, owned the other personal property there.  Based on Snyder’s
admission, on August 6, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court granted Appellees’ motion to
4dismiss the adversary case and denied Snyder’s request to reconsider an earlier order
denying a remand of the adversary proceeding to state court.  Regarding Snyder’s tools
and building materials, the Bankruptcy Court noted that Snyder did not produce evidence
that his personal property was on the property, and that, to the extent that such property
existed, it was without value.  Snyder appealed.
The District Court rejected Snyder’s principal argument that the Bankruptcy Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding because his bankruptcy
case had been dismissed.  The District Court explained that, while the dismissal of a
bankruptcy proceeding normally results in the dismissal of related proceedings,
jurisdiction is premised on the nexus between the bankruptcy case and the related
property.  The District Court concluded that reopening was proper and that the requisite
nexus existed given that the Bankruptcy Judge had previously granted in rem relief to the
Appellees as to the properties at issue in Snyder’s state court action.  The District Court
also stated that the Bankruptcy Judge wanted to ensure that Snyder recovered his personal
property and that the estate retained its property.  The District Court noted that the
Bankruptcy Judge reviewed the mortgage Snyder had signed, which gave rise to the
foreclosure of the apartment property.
We agree that the Bankruptcy Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the
adversary proceeding.  At the June 2, 2006, hearing, the Bankruptcy Judge recognized the
limited bankruptcy purpose of the proceedings before her, noting that Snyder had not
5filed a Chapter 13 plan and was unable to make plan payments.  The Bankruptcy Court,
however, explained that it was the only court that could determine what personalty
belonged to Snyder because that decision would determine what personalty was the
property of the estate, a core matter in the bankruptcy.
We also agree with the District Court that, to the extent Snyder challenges the
Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings regarding the items he sought to replevy from the
apartment property, he did not show that those findings were clearly erroneous.  The
record reflects Snyder’s admission that the personalty on the property, other than certain
tools and materials, belonged to his mother.  Finally, we disagree with Snyder’s
contention in District Court that the Bankruptcy Court erred in dismissing his Landlord
Tenant Act claims.  The Bankruptcy Court construed Snyder’s First Amended Complaint
as seeking replevin of personal property for violations of the Act, and correctly dismissed
his claim based on his concession regarding the ownership of the property.
Because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will summary affirm
the District Court’s order.
